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According to Kakwani and Lambert (1998), an equitable income tax should respect three 
axioms related to each taxpayer’s tax liability, average tax rate and post-tax income: whenever 
taxation determines unequal tax treatments among equals or modifies pre-tax ordering, it 
influences the potential vertical effect of the tax through three types of inequity. Following the 
authors’ measurement system, we investigate changes in axiom violations due to the 2007 
Italian personal income tax reform, that introduced significant changes in the tax structure. Our 
microsimulation model uses as input data those provided by the Bank of Italy in its Survey on 
Households Income and Wealth in the year 2006; estimates of the distribution of taxpayers are 
very close to the Ministry of Finance official statistics. The analysis considers both the 
individual and equivalent household gross income distribution and evaluates the decomposition 
with and without surtaxes. Main findings suggest that both in the 2006 and 2007 tax system 
most of the overall violations concern the axiom demanding the average tax rate to be a non 
decreasing function with respect to the gross income; the axiom requiring richer taxpayers to 
pay higher tax liabilities than poorer ones and the axiom requiring the tax to do not introduce re-
rankings in the pre-tax income order present minor violations. The 2007 reform enhances both 
the potential redistributive effect, that is the one that could be obtained without axiom 
violations, and the axiom violations: the net result is a small positive variation of the actual 
redistributive effect. These phenomena appear more relevant for taxpayers than those for 
equivalent households. For what concerns taxpayers, the 2007 reform has modified also the 
composition of the three axiom violations, that remains almost the same whenever equivalent 
households are considered. Finally, focusing on each decile of the income distribution, 
regressivities are concentrated in the bottom five deciles of the income distribution both for 
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1. Introduction 
The Italian Personal Income Tax (hereafter PIT) has been intensively modified in the 
last 15 years. Until 2002 tax progressivity was guaranteed by a system of piecewise 
decreasing tax credits and increasing marginal tax rates with 5 brackets. Then this 
system has been modified by consistent reforms in 2003, 2005 and 2007. The 2005 
reform completed that of 2003. In particular, during the period 2005-2006 tax 
progressivity was focused on a system of income related tax deductions linearly 
decreasing with respect to gross income; from 2007 onwards, it is instead based on a 
system of income related tax credits linearly decreasing with respect to gross income. 
Moreover, the shift from the 2006 system to the 2007 system has enhanced the taxable 
income relevant for local governments for all households with dependent individuals. 
Finally, rate schedule has been modified by the 2007 reform: the number of brackets 
raised from 4 to 5, and the level of tax rate has been enhanced for higher incomes. 
With regard to efficiency, the 2003 and 2005 tax system has been criticised as, due to 
the income related deduction system, the number and the level of the effective marginal 
tax rates were much higher than the tax code ones (Paladini, 2003; Galmarini, 2004; 
Pellegrino, 2007b); these unpleasant outcomes have been intensively reduced by the 
2007 reform. On the equity ground, the 2007 reform has only enhanced the PIT 
redistributive effect (Pellegrino, 2007b) a little, so that another question arises: how do 
changes in the tax structure influence the PIT potential vertical effect and the horizontal 
inequity as well as the re-rankings? 
In order to answer this question we apply the Kakwani and Lambert (1998) approach for 
the redistributive effect decomposition to the 2006 and 2007 PIT structure; both the 
individual gross income distribution and the equivalent household gross income 
distribution have been analysed. According to this methodology, an equitable income 
tax should respect three axioms related to each taxpayer’s tax liability, average tax rate 
and post-tax income: whenever taxation determines unequal tax treatments among 
equals or modifies pre-tax ordering, it influences the potential vertical effect through 
three possible types of inequity. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main 
characteristics of the tax structure in 2006 and 2007. Section 3 discusses the Kakwani  2 
 
and Lambert (1998) approach for the redistributive effect decomposition. Section 4 
describes the data and the microsimulation model used for simulations. Section 5 
presents the results, whilst section 6 briefly summarises the paper. 
 
 
2. The Personal Income Tax in Italy: institutional and technical details 
The 2006 tax structure 
Let  i x  be the personal gross income. The tax law considers four different deductions: 
( )
MR
i i x d
1  is the income-related deduction for earned income;  ( )
MR
i i x d
2  is the income-
related deduction for dependent children and spouse as well as other individuals; 
3
i d  is 
deduction for the main residence cadastral income; 
4
i d  is a group of deductions for 
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where  h  is equal to 26,000 euro, and 
p
i d
1  is the corresponding potential deduction 
(differentiated by the kind of earned income: 7,500 euro for employees, 7,000 for 































































i i  
where f is equal to 78,000 euro, and 
p
i d
2  is the corresponding potential deduction for 
dependent persons within the household (3,200 for dependent spouse, and 2,900 for 
each dependent child and other individuals). 
Applying the rate schedule  ( )
CG
i y S  to the taxable income 
CG
i y , the gross tax liability 
( )
CG
i i y S GT =  is obtained (Table 1). In this tax period, tax law admits only tax credits 
for items of expenditure 
1
i c  (other than those considered by 
4
i d ). As a consequence, the 
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Moreover, a surtax on PIT is levied by the region R and by the municipality M in which 
the taxpayer lives. The taxable income relevant for local governments differs from that 
relevant for the central government: 
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Tax rates are differentiated between regions and municipalities. At the regional level, 
the standard rate is .9 per cent, but regions can raise it up to 1.4 per cent; the systems 
adopted are also different: flat rate, progressive bracket-base rates and progressive class-
base rates. At the municipality level, only the flat system is permitted, and up to 2006 
the tax rate cannot exceed .5 per cent (.8 per cent from 2007). Then the post-tax income 











i T x z − =  if only the central government tax debt is considered. 
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The 2007 tax structure 
From 2007 onwards, the deduction for earned income  ( )
MR
i i x d
1  and the deduction for 
type of relationship  ( )
MR
i i x d
2  have been eliminated and corresponding tax credits have 
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Note that the 2007 taxable income relevant for local governments is greater than the 
2006 one; this implies, ceteris paribus, a greater tax debt levied by the local government 
for all households with dependent individuals within the household. The 2007 rate 
schedule  ( )
CG
i y S  is reported in Table 2. From 2007 onwards, tax law admits three 
distinct kinds of tax credits. They are: tax credit for items of expenditure 
1
i c ; tax credit 
for earned income  ( )
MR
i i x c
2 ; tax credit for dependent individuals within the household 
( )
MR
i i x c
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where t is the lowest marginal tax rate (23 per cent); m is equal to 8,000 euro for 
employees, 7,500 for pensioners younger than 75, 7,750 for pensioners older than 75, 
4,800 for the self-employed, and zero for non working taxpayers; k is equal to 15,000 
euro for employees and pensioners, whilst it is equal to w for the self-employed; w is 
equal to 55,000 euro for all taxpayers; a is equal to 502 euro for employees, 470 for 
pensioners younger than 75, 486 for pensioners older than 75, zero for self-employed  5 
 
and non working taxpayers; b, that ranges from 10 to 40 euro in the bandwidth 23-28 
thousands euro, is applied only to employees. 
There are three different tax credits for type of relationship: tax credit for dependent 
















3 . The overall value for  ( )
MR
i i x c
3  is then 
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where n is the number of dependent children, e is equal to 15,000 euro and q is equal to 





3  is the corresponding potential tax credit: it is 800 and 900 euro if the 
dependent child is younger and older than 3 years, respectively, and the dependent children 
within the households are 3 or less; these corresponding potential tax credits are 200 euro 
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3  is equal to 800 
euro (or less for some income bandwidths). 
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3. The Kakwani and Lambert methodology for the redistributive effect 
decomposition 
Let  i x  and  i T  be the pre-tax income and the tax debt of individual or household i, with 
N i ..., , 2 , 1 = . Then observation’s i post-tax income is equal to  i i i T x z − = . In order to 
be classified as strictly progressive, an income tax should respect three axioms 
(Kakwani and Lambert, 1998). 
Starting by considering all possible income unit pairs { } j i,  in the income distribution, 
the first axiom requires richer taxpayers to pay higher tax liabilities than poorer ones. 
This implies: 
j i j i T T x x ≥ ⇒ ≥           ( 1 )  
This axiom requires the minimal progression: when gross income increases, tax 
liabilities cannot decrease; however, they can be equal, so that (1) can be satisfied in the 
so-called “no tax area”, regarding poorest taxpayers with a zero tax debt. 
The second axiom demands the average tax rate to be a non decreasing function with 









T T and x x ≥ ⇒ ≥ ≥         ( 2 )  
This axiom recalls the progressive principle: average tax rate for richer taxpayers should 
be greater (or at least equal) than those faced by poorer ones. It can be satisfied only 









< . Note 
that (2) permits a proportional income tax as well as a tax characterised by a piecewise 
linear average tax function. 
Finally, a progressive tax satisfying (1) and (2) with non confiscatory tax rates excludes 












and T T and x x ≥ ⇒ ≥ ≥ ≥       ( 3 )   7 
 
The non re-ranking requirement can be evaluated whenever (1) and (2) hold; if (1) does 
not hold, than re-ranking cannot occur: if  j i x x ≥  and  j i T T < , then  j i z z ≥ ; similarly, if 









< , so that  j i z z ≥ . 
Turning to the consideration of the whole income distribution, the three axioms can be 
summarised as follow. Let  X G ,  T G ,  A G  and  Z G  be the Gini coefficient for pre-tax 
incomes, tax liabilities, average tax rates and post-tax incomes, respectively; let the 
corresponding concentration coefficients be  T C ,  A C  and  Z C  (tax debts, average tax 
rates and post-tax incomes are ordered according to the pre-tax income ordering). 
Finally, let define  T T T C G R − = ,  A A A C G R − =  and  Z Z Z C G R − = . 
The first axiom is violated whenever tax debts ordering differs from the pre-tax income 
one. It follows that (1) is not satisfied whenever the concentration coefficient for tax 
debts  T C  is smaller than the corresponding Gini coefficient  T G :  0 ≥ T R . 
Focusing only on all income pairs { } j i,  for which (1) holds, the second axiom is 
violated whenever the tax rate ordering differs from the pre-tax ordering; Kakwani and 
Lambert (1998) suggest checking the second axiom by the difference  AT R R − : “if zero 
[positive] this suggest that Axiom 2 is upheld [violated]”. The authors observe that even 
if  AT R R −  could go negative, they never found it negative in their extensive 
simulations. 
Finally, focusing only on all income pairs { } j i,  for which (2) holds, the third axiom is 
violated whenever the post-tax ordering differs from the pre-tax one, that is whenever 
Z C  is smaller than the corresponding Gini coefficient  Z G :  0 ≥ Z R . 
If the three axiom violations are taken into account, let us now see the redistributive 
effect decomposition. The redistributive effect is  Z X G G RE − = , while the Kakwani 
and Reynolds-Smolensky indexes are  T T G C K − =  and  Z X C G RS − = , respectively.  8 
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It is possible to verify (Kakwani and Lambert, 1998) that 
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 indicates the potential redistributive effect, that is the 













2  and  Z R S =
3  measure the violation of axiom 1, 2 
and 3, respectively. 
In order to study the dimension of axiom violations within the income distribution, as 
Gini and concentration coefficients derive from the Lorenz and concentration curves, it 
is possible to decompose the redistributive effect also by income deciles. 
Let  ) (p LXX ,  ) (p LTT ,  ) (p LAA  and  ) (p LZZ  be the Lorenz curves for pre-tax incomes, 
tax liabilities, average tax rates and post-tax incomes, respectively. We label the 
corresponding concentration curves, when the ordering is assigned by pre-tax incomes 
ranking, as  ) (p LTX ,  ) (p LAX  and  ) (p LZX . 
Then, the following decomposition holds: 
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Multiplying (5) by 2 and integrating (5) from  0 = p  to  1 = p , equation (4) is obtained 
(Kakwani and Lambert, 1998). The first term measures the potential redistributive 
effect, while the other three terms, as previously discussed, the violation of axiom 1, 2 
and 3, respectively.  9 
 
4. Data and main feature of the microsimulation model 
As input data, we make use of the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and 
Wealth (hereafter SHIW) published in 2008. It contains information on household post-
tax income and wealth in the year 2006, covering 7,768 households, and 19,848 
individuals. According to definition in the survey, “a household is a group of persons 
living together, whether related by kinship or not, who fulfill their needs by pooling all 
or part of the income earned by the members”; …“the head of the household is defined 
as the person earning the highest income (excluding property income)” (Bank of Italy, 
2008). The sample is representative of the Italian population, composed of about 23,5 
million households and 60 million individuals. For further details on the sample 
selection and aggregate statistics see Brandolini (1999) and Bank of Italy (2008). 
The microsimulation model employed for this paper estimates all the most important 
taxes and contributions characterising the Italian fiscal system. Here we focus only on 
the PIT module of the microsimulation. Additional details on the algorithm used in the 
transition from the post- to the pre-tax income of each taxpayer are given in Pellegrino 
(2007a). 
Results concerning the PIT gross income distribution are very close to the Ministry of 
Finance (2008) official statistics both considering the composition of PIT taxpayers by 
work status as well as by their mean gross income and the gross income distribution by 
income classes (see Pellegrino et. al. 2010 for further details). 
Once each individual gross and net money incomes have been simulated, we evaluate 
them also at household level. In order to obtain equivalent incomes, we divided 
household money income by the Cutler Scale (CS), defined as: 
( )
β α C A N N CS + =  
where  A N  and  C N  are, respectively, the number of adults and children (individual 
within the household aged 17 or less) within each household and  1 0 ≤ ≤α  and 
1 0 ≤ ≤ β  are parameters: the first one assigns a different weight to children with respect 
to adults, whilst the latter indicates the economies of scale attached to the equivalence 
scale. Following van de Ven et al. (2003), we choose the equivalence scale parameters 
that minimise the re-ranking index (Figure 1): α  is equal to .31, .29, .39 and .34 in  10 
 
2006 and 2007, without and with surtaxes, respectively; corresponding values for β  are 
.77, .70, .76 and .70. 
Table 3 shows the inequality indexes both for individuals and equivalent households. 




i T x z − = , 
and the overall PIT, so that  i i i T x z − = . 
Focusing on taxpayers, the pre- and post-tax Gini coefficient are 44.14 and 38.79 (39.00 
without surtaxes), respectively. The overall redistributive effect RE is then 5.35 (5.14) 
in 2006 and 5.57 (5.34) in 2007: this raise is due to the increase of both the overall 
average tax rate and the Kakwani index; as expected, including surtaxes, RE and the 
average tax rate are higher, whilst K is smaller than those observed without surtaxes. 
Note that tax modifications enhanced the Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani re-ranking index 
from 0.07 to 0.08 without surtaxes and from .008 to .009 with surtaxes. A similar 
picture emerges whenever equivalent households are considered: the overall 




We start by analysing the RE decomposition for taxpayers. The 2007 reform has 




 is equal to 
115.45 with surtaxes and to 114.73 without surtaxes (Table 4 and 5); in 2007 the 
corresponding values are 129.91 and 130.07, respectively (Table 6 and 7). These results 
imply that axiom violations played a more important role in 2007 with respect to 2006. 
In particular, it is the second axiom that presents the most remarkable values in the 
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fall from 27 per cent to 16 per cent and from 9 to 5, respectively. 
Tables 4-7 report also each decile gross and net income share with respect to the overall 
incomes as well as the RE decomposition: in both years considered, the net income 
share is bigger than the gross one for the first 8 deciles, whilst it is smaller for the last 
two. In particular, the regressivities are detected in the first four income deciles; for the 
remaining upper deciles the actual income share is greater than the one that should be 
obtained without axiom violations. Note that in 2006 no regressivities are registered in 
the first decile. This result has a technical explanation: in contrast to the 2007 tax code, 
in 2006 the income-related deduction for earned income  ( )
MR
i i x d
1  was applied to all 
taxpayers, also to non workers; as a consequence, almost all taxpayers in the first decile 
have no tax debt, so that no inequity can be observed. This is the reason why we 
observe a singificant negative value in the first decile of 2007 taxpayers (−0.62 in Table 
6, −0.58 in Table 7), quite higher, in absolute terms, than the figure observed for the 
other nine deciles: this is what makes S
2 violation much greater in 2007 than in 2006. 
Turning to equivalent households, results are presented in Tables 8-11. The increase of 





 is equal to 109.31 with surtaxes and to 109.53 without surtaxes; in 2007 
the corresponding values are 112.24 and 112.21, respectively. The composition of 
regressivities has not been substantially modified by the reform: violation of axiom 2 










 in 2006 and 68 per cent in 2007 of the overall 
violations; corresponding values for axiom 1 are 25 and 23, respectively, whilst 
violation of axiom 3 is equal in the two years considered. These results depend on the 
application of the equivalence scale evaluated in order to minimise re-ranking. 
Turning to decile decomposition, a similar picture with respect to taxpayers emerges. It 
is worth stressing that, after having applied the equivalence scale, the reduction in the  12 
 
violation of S
2 is much greater in 2007 than in 2006: this effect is mainly originated by 
the first decile. As underlined before, in 2007 tax system the no tax area is applied only 
to work incomes, which makes axiom 2 violation particularly remarkable with respect 
to 2006: in the first decile, due to low incomes, individual tax credits for family charges 
success by themselves in reducing dissimilarities in tax liability among households, 
even with personal tax credits that are quite different. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Since the Italian personal income tax has been intensively modified by the 2007 reform, 
in this paper we study how these changes influenced the potential redistributive effect 
and the importance of the three axiom violations according to the Kakwani and Lambert 
(1998) methodology. 
Main findings suggest that both in the 2006 and 2007 tax system most of the overall 
violations concern the axiom demanding the average tax rate to be a non decreasing 
function with respect to the gross income; the axiom requiring richer taxpayers to pay 
higher tax liabilities than poorer ones and the axiom requiring the tax to do not 
introduce re-rankings in the pre-tax income order present minor violations. The 2007 
reform enhances both the potential redistributive effect, that is the one that could be 
obtained without axiom violations, and the axiom violations: the net result is a small 
positive variation of the actual redistributive effect. These phenomena appear more 
relevant for taxpayers than those for equivalent households. Concerning taxpayers, the 
2007 reform has modified also the composition of the three axiom violations, that 
remains almost the same whenever equivalent households are considered. Finally, 
focusing on each decile of the income distribution, regressivities are concentrated in the 
bottom five deciles of the income distribution both for taxpayers and equivalent 
households.  13 
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Table 1: Central Government marginal tax rates before the 2007 reform 
Tax base (euro)  Tax rate (%) 
     up to   26.000  23 
  from        26.000    up to   33.500  33 
  from        33.500    up to 100.000  39 
above      100.000     43 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2007.   
 
Table 2: Central Government marginal tax rates after the 2007 reform 
Tax base (euro)  Tax rate (%) 
     up to   15.000  23 
  from        15.000    up to   28.000  27 
  from        28.000    up to   55.000  38 
  from        55.000    up to   75.000  41 
 above       75.000     43 
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2007.   
 





Table 3: Inequality indexes 
   Taxpayers        Equivalent households 
   Without surtaxes     With surtaxes        Without surtaxes     With surtaxes 
Indexes  2006  2007    2006  2007        2006  2007    2006  2007 
Average tax rate (%)  18.51  18.44     19.72  19.78        18.66  18.56     19.88  19.90 
Gini coefficient for the gross income  44.14  44.14    44.14  44.14        39.34  39.25     39.36  39.26 
Gini coefficient for the net income  39.00  38.80    38.79  38.57        34.28  33.93    34.09  33.73 
Gini coefficient for the tax  67.94  69.21     67.12  68.14        62.11  63.51     61.25  62.38 
Redistributive effect  5.14  5.34     5.35  5.57        5.06  5.32     5.26  5.53 
Concentration index for the net income  38.93  38.72     38.71  38.48        34.24  33.88     34.04  33.67 
Concentration index for the tax  67.04  68.08     66.22  67.08        61.58  62.85     60.76  61.77 
Kakwani index  22.91  23.94     22.09  22.94        22.24  23.59     21.41  22.51 
Reynolds-Smolensky index  5.20  5.41     5.43  5.65        5.10  5.38     5.31  5.59 
Atkinson-Plotnick-Kakwani index  0.07  0.08     0.08  0.09        0.04  0.05     0.05  0.06 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.                      
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Figure 1: Cutler scale parameters and R/RE minimisation in 2006 
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Table 4: RE decomposition for taxpayers in 2006 with surtaxes 
Decile  Pre-tax 
income 
Post-tax 
income  Difference Potential 
equity  Axiom 1  Axiom 2  Axiom 3  Total 
Axioms 
1  0.52 0.65 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2  2.80 3.44 0.65 0.82 -0.03 -0.14 -0.01 -0.17 
3  4.32 5.16 0.84 1.34 -0.13 -0.35 -0.01 -0.50 
4  6.00 6.81 0.81 0.98 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.17 
5 7.53  8.28  0.75  0.68  0.01  0.07  -0.02  0.07 
6 8.94  9.55  0.61  0.50  0.03  0.10  -0.01  0.12 
7  10.32  10.81  0.49 0.32 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.17 
8  12.10  12.41  0.31 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.22 
9  15.14  15.02  -0.12  -0.30 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.18 
10 32.33  27.86  -4.47  -4.56 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.09 
Total 44.14 38.79  5.35  6.17 -0.22 -0.53 -0.08 -0.83 
%   -   -  100.00  115.45  -4.11  -9.87  -1.48  -15.45 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.           
 
Table 5: RE decomposition for taxpayers in 2006 without surtaxes 
Decile  Pre-tax 
income 
Post-tax 
income  Difference Potential 
equity  Axiom 1  Axiom 2  Axiom 3  Total 
Axioms 
1  0.52 0.64 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2  2.80 3.40 0.60 0.75 -0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -0.14 
3  4.32 5.13 0.81 1.26 -0.12 -0.32 -0.01 -0.45 
4  6.00 6.79 0.79 0.98 -0.07 -0.09 -0.03 -0.19 
5 7.53  8.26  0.73  0.67  0.01  0.06  -0.01  0.06 
6 8.94  9.54  0.60  0.49  0.03  0.09  -0.01  0.11 
7  10.32  10.80  0.48 0.32 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.16 
8  12.10  12.41  0.30 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.20 
9  15.14  15.03  -0.11  -0.28 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.17 
10 32.33  28.00  -4.33  -4.41 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.08 
Total 44.14 39.00  5.14  5.89 -0.20 -0.48 -0.07 -0.76 
%   -   -  100.00  114.73  -3.98  -9.43  -1.33  -14.73 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.           
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Table 6: RE decomposition for taxpayers in 2007 with surtaxes 
Decile  Pre-tax 
income 
Post-tax 
income  Difference Potential 
equity  Axiom 1  Axiom 2  Axiom 3  Total 
Axioms 
1  0.52 0.63 0.11 0.75 -0.02 -0.62 0.00 -0.64 
2  2.80 3.42 0.62 0.96 -0.05 -0.27 -0.01 -0.34 
3  4.32 5.19 0.87 1.24 -0.12 -0.24 -0.01 -0.37 
4 6.00  6.87  0.88  0.88  -0.06  0.08  -0.02  -0.01 
5 7.53  8.36  0.82  0.65  0.02  0.16  -0.02  0.17 
6 8.94  9.62  0.69  0.50  0.04  0.17  -0.01  0.19 
7  10.32  10.87  0.55 0.31 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.24 
8  12.10  12.46  0.36 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.31 
9  15.14  15.05  -0.09  -0.45 0.06 0.27 0.03 0.37 
10 32.33  27.53  -4.80  -4.89 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.09 
Total 44.14 38.57  5.57  7.23 -0.26 -1.32 -0.09 -1.67 
%   -   -  100.00  129.91  -4.69  -23.66  -1.56  -29.91 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.           
 
Table 7: RE decomposition for taxpayers in 2007 without surtaxes 
Decile  Pre-tax 
income 
Post-tax 
income  Difference Potential 
equity  Axiom 1  Axiom 2  Axiom 3  Total 
Axioms 
1  0.52 0.62 0.10 0.70 -0.02 -0.58 0.00 -0.61 
2  2.80 3.37 0.58 0.87 -0.05 -0.24 -0.01 -0.29 
3  4.32 5.14 0.82 1.20 -0.11 -0.25 -0.01 -0.38 
4 6.00  6.85  0.85  0.90  -0.07  0.05  -0.02  -0.05 
5 7.53  8.34  0.80  0.66  0.01  0.15  -0.01  0.15 
6 8.94  9.61  0.67  0.49  0.04  0.16  -0.01  0.18 
7  10.32  10.87  0.55 0.31 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.24 
8  12.10  12.46  0.36 0.06 0.07 0.23 0.01 0.31 
9  15.14  15.07  -0.07  -0.44 0.06 0.27 0.03 0.37 
10 32.33  27.67  -4.66  -4.74 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.09 
Total 44.14 38.80  5.34  6.94 -0.26 -1.27 -0.08 -1.60 
%   -   -  100.00  130.07  -4.79  -23.82  -1.46  -30.07 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.           
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Table 8: RE decomposition for households in 2006 with surtaxes 
Decile  Pre-tax 
income 
Post-tax 
income  Difference Potential 
equity  Axiom 1  Axiom 2  Axiom 3  Total 
Axioms 
1  1.72 2.14 0.42 0.46 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 
2  3.72 4.51 0.79 0.99 -0.05 -0.14 -0.01 -0.20 
3  5.01 5.76 0.75 0.82 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 
4  6.27 6.92 0.65 0.73 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 
5  7.46 8.05 0.59 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6  8.77 9.27 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
7 10.24  10.61  0.37  0.33  0.00 0.06  -0.01  0.04 
8  12.06  12.24  0.18 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.09 
9  15.18  14.84  -0.34  -0.42 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08 
10 29.56  25.66  -3.90  -4.06 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.16 
Total 39.36 34.09  5.26  5.75 -0.12 -0.32 -0.05 -0.49 
%   -   -  100.00  109.31  -2.31  -6.10  -0.91  -9.31 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.           
 
Table 9: RE decomposition for households in 2006 without surtaxes 
Decile  Pre-tax 
income 
Post-tax 
income  Difference Potential 
equity  Axiom 1  Axiom 2  Axiom 3  Total 
Axioms 
1  1.73 2.12 0.39 0.42 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 
2  3.73 4.47 0.74 0.96 -0.05 -0.15 -0.01 -0.21 
3  5.02 5.74 0.73 0.79 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 
4  6.27 6.90 0.63 0.71 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.08 
5  7.46 8.03 0.57 0.56 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
6  8.76 9.25 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
7 10.25  10.61  0.37  0.32  0.00 0.06  -0.01  0.05 
8  12.06  12.25  0.18 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.08 
9 15.16  14.84  -0.32  -0.40  0.02 0.06  -0.01  0.08 
10 29.56  25.77  -3.79  -3.95 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.16 
Total 39.34 34.28  5.06  5.54 -0.12 -0.32 -0.04 -0.48 
%   -   -  100.00  109.53  -2.41  -6.24  -0.87  -9.53 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.           
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Table 10: RE decomposition for households in 2007 with surtaxes 
Decile  Pre-tax 
income 
Post-tax 
income  Difference Potential 
equity  Axiom 1  Axiom 2  Axiom 3  Total 
Axioms 
1  1.74 2.16 0.41 0.55 -0.02 -0.12 0.00 -0.14 
2  3.73 4.54 0.81 1.03 -0.05 -0.15 -0.02 -0.22 
3  5.01 5.82 0.80 0.86 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 
4  6.28 6.97 0.70 0.79 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 
5 7.47  8.12  0.64  0.63  0.00  0.02  -0.01  0.02 
6 8.77  9.30  0.53  0.54  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
7 10.23  10.64  0.41  0.35  0.00 0.07  -0.01  0.06 
8  12.06  12.27  0.21 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 
9  15.22  14.88  -0.34  -0.48 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.14 
10 29.48  25.31  -4.17  -4.36 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.19 
Total 39.26 33.73  5.53  6.21 -0.15 -0.46 -0.06 -0.68 
% -  -  100.00  112.24  -2.75  -8.41  -1.08  -12.24 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.           
 
Table 11: RE decomposition for households in 2007 without surtaxes 
Decile  Pre-tax 
income 
Post-tax 
income  Difference Potential 
equity  Axiom 1  Axiom 2  Axiom 3  Total 
Axioms 
1  1.75 2.13 0.38 0.51 -0.02 -0.11 0.00 -0.12 
2  3.74 4.50 0.77 0.97 -0.05 -0.14 -0.01 -0.20 
3  5.02 5.80 0.78 0.85 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 
4  6.27 6.95 0.68 0.77 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.09 
5 7.48  8.10  0.63  0.62  0.00  0.01  -0.01  0.01 
6 8.76  9.28  0.52  0.53  -0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
7 10.23  10.64  0.41  0.35  0.00 0.07  -0.01  0.06 
8  12.06  12.27  0.21 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.11 
9  15.21  14.90  -0.31  -0.45 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.14 
10 29.48  25.42  -4.06  -4.24 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.18 
Total 39.25 33.93  5.32  5.97 -0.15 -0.45 -0.05 -0.65 
%   -   -  100.00  112.21  -2.83  -8.36  -1.02  -12.21 
Source: Own elaborations on SHIW.           
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